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Creators of new technologies seek to signal a message of 
novelty and improvement. Instinctively, many of us want to 
endorse the message and believe that this new technology will 
improve our lives.  There is an intuitive desire to believe that a 
new technology is special and unique.  Consequently, 
regulators, judges and scholars tend to look at each new 
technology in isolation.  For example, scholars tend to focus on 
the study of either communications law or the law of medical 
technologies, often specializing in the legal study of a specific 
technology, such as the Internet or genetics.1  Similarly, 
©  2007 Gaia Bernstein. 
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 1. See for example, Lawrence Lessig’s writings in the area of cyberlaw, 
which include: LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
(1999), LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001).  Also, see Lori 
Andrews’ writings on medical technologies, particularly on genetics, which 
include: LORI ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT 
GENETICS (2001), Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need 
BERNSTEIN G. Toward a General Theory on Law and Technology: Introduction. MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 2007;8(2):441-447. 
442 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:2 
 
                                                          
 
legislatures often formulate special legislation to deal with 
specific technological threats.  An example of a recent trend is 
legislation targeting privacy threats imposed by cell-phone 
cameras. 2 
 For a brief time during the 1970s, different winds were 
blowing in legal academia. Lawrence Tribe in a book entitled, 
Channeling Technology through Law, discussed the 
“Technological Assessment” approach.3  Technology assessment 
undertakes a broader approach to the evaluation and 
regulation of new technologies that does not focus on specific 
technologies.  Yet, in the decades to follow, the legal approach 
to new technologies did not follow this lead, instead it remained 
technology-specific. 
 The goal of this symposium was to inquire whether the 
assessment and reaction to each new technology in isolation is 
the best mode for technology regulation or whether a broader 
outlook would better serve the social accommodation of new 
technologies.  Specifically, the scholars participating in the 
symposium set out to inquire whether the compartmentalized 
mode of regulation should be replaced or supplemented by a 
general theory of law and technology.  Such a theory would 
provide a generalized legal approach to the use and adoption of 
new technologies, specifying guidelines for approaching 
instances in which a new technology threatens to destabilize 
existing social institutes, values, and norms.  For example, 
legislators and scholars are currently debating the suitable 
solution for resolving the privacy threats imposed by the 
incorporation of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems 
tags into passports.4  A generalized approach could provide 
guidelines based on prior instances in which technologies 
disrupted social values or on cases in which the value of privacy 
was threatened by new technologies. 
 The symposium papers examine two main issues.  The first 
for Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
403 (2005). 
 2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 810.145 (Supp. 2006)); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/26-4 (Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE Wash. §  9A.44.115 (2007). 
 3. See  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 
(1973). See also Laurence H. Tribe, Legal Frameworks for the Assessment and 
Control of Technology, 9 MINERVA 243 (1971). 
 4. For an overview of the topic, see, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems, http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid 
(last updated Apr. 13, 2007). 
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meta-theme is why would it be desirable to develop and utilize 
a general theory of law and technology?  What weaknesses in 
the current system warrant a turn to a more generalized 
approach?  The significance of justifying the need for an 
adoption of a general theory of law and technology stems (at 
least partly) from concerns about the dangers that could 
accompany the implementation of such a generalized approach.  
The developed guidelines could be used to reach decisions at an 
early stage of the diffusion of a new technology. At that point, 
the potential of a new technology is often partly unknown.  Use 
of general principles derived from the regulation of previous 
technologies could stifle technologies from reaching their full 
potential.  Consequently, it was imperative to explore at the 
outset whether the limitations of the current system warrant 
an effort to formulate general principles that could at least 
supplement the existing system. 
 The second meta-theme is what should be the form of a 
general theory of law and technology?  The development of a 
comprehensive general theory of law and technology could only 
occur over time.  The purpose of the inquiry within the 
framework of this symposium was to highlight potential 
approaches to the formulation of such a theory.  A general 
theory of law and technology could adopt broader or narrower 
principles, that is principles that are applicable to all 
technologies, or guidelines that differentiate between categories 
of technologies or technological controversies involving 
destabilizations of different social values.  Further, different 
perceptions of human nature and of its relationship to 
technology could produce different theories of law and 
technology.  The array of proposals developed by the 
symposium’s participants underscore the richness of the subject 
as a future research topic and the important decisions that will 
need to be made in order to formulate a general theory. 
 Two of the participating scholars: Lyria Bennett Moses and 
Daniel Gifford address the first symposium meta-theme—is 
there a need for a general theory of law and technology?  Both 
scholars underscore the importance of a generalized approach 
to the study of the interactions between law and technology. 
Lyria Bennett Moses defines technology as that which 
overcomes the physical.  She highlighted the uniqueness of 
technological change, arguing that its distinctiveness explains 
the need for a separate theorization of its relationship to law.  
Particularly, Bennett Moses justifies the need for the 
development of a separate theory of law and technology by 
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showing the ways in which (i) technological change differs from 
social change; and (ii) changes in technological knowledge are 
distinguished from transformations in other forms of 
knowledge.5 
 Daniel Gifford demonstrates the importance of a 
generalized view of law and technology by illuminating the 
clearer vision derived from a broader look at the interactions 
between law and technology.  Gifford focuses on the 
interactions between intellectual property law and technology.  
By looking beyond specific doctrines and technologies he 
provides a description of the interactions between intellectual 
property laws and competition laws.  Further, using this 
broader outlook Gifford identifies existing gaps and failures in 
law and market interactions.6 
 Andrea Matwyshyn and Kieran Tranter address both 
meta-themes.  They derive their view of what a theory of law 
and technology should look like from their analysis of the 
weaknesses of the prevailing compartmentalized approach. 
 Andrea Matwyshyn reviews three of the key techno-legal 
debates of the last decade.  She demonstrates that the 
compartmentalized approach, which focuses on a specific 
technology or legal issue, fails to resolve questions as to 
whether a new technology was special or whether a current 
regulatory regime could be applied to a new innovation.  
Further, Matwyshyn argues that compartmentalization 
obstructs the discussion of users’ perceptions and development.  
She offers a generalized approach to technological controversies 
that focuses on human development.  Specifically, she suggests 
that a non-linear view of development should replace the 
currently used linear approach.  While a linear approach 
presumes homogeneity in consumer population regarding 
individuals’ sophistication and comfort level with technology, a 
non-linear approach accounts for the effects of the 
environment.  Through the case study of the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) she illustrates the 
shortcomings of a regulatory approach driven by linear 
assumptions about development.7 
 5. Lyria Bennett Moses, Why Have a Theory of Law and Technological 
Change, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 589 (2007). 
 6. Daniel Gifford, Law and Technology: Interactions and Relationship, 8 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 571 (2007). 
 7. Andrea Matwyshyn, Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity, 8 
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 515 (2007) 
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Kieran Tranter argues that much of law and technology 
scholarship articulates elements of the Frankenstein myth.  
The myth features the rational scientist as too preoccupied 
with techniques to consider the wider context of his illicit 
creation and consequently the produced monster (and 
technology) is presented as external to humanity.  Yet, Tranter 
explains that at the same time, the invocation of law to save 
society involves the re-inscription of the Frankenstein myth. 
Law is considered technological, a discourse about techniques 
and effectiveness and the human becomes a mere animal. 
Tranter suggests that the Frankenstein myth should be 
replaced with a view that situates technology within being.  
Specifically, he suggests two alternative approaches that could 
enrich the study of law and technology.  The first proposal is a 
historical project that would involve a detailed study of 
networks that manifest in particular technologies and specific 
moments of law-making.  The second approach is a focus on the 
sophistication of contemporary culture and its relationship to 
the development of a highly dynamic technological life.8 
 Several of the symposium’s participants focus exclusively 
on the second meta-theme—proposing a potential form for a 
theory of law and technology.  The approaches differ in their 
level of generality.  Gregory Mandel, Arthur Cockfield and 
Jason Pridmore suggest a theory that is applicable to all 
technologies, while Gaia Bernstein and Frank Pasquale 
undertake a relatively narrower approach.  Gaia Bernstein 
suggests principles that apply to categories of technologies 
according to their technological characteristics.  Frank 
Pasquale differentiates between technologies based on their 
societal impact; focusing on technologies that destabilize 
equality. 
 Gregory Mandel proposes general guidelines for 
interactions between law and technology that can be applied 
across a broad spectrum of technologies.  Mandel focuses on 
insights derived from historical and current technologies, and 
proposed three main guidelines.  First, Mandel suggests that 
using preexisting legal categories by analogizing the function of 
a new technology to that of an older technology is not workable.  
Instead, he proposes focusing on the rationale behind the 
categorization system to determine whether an analogy is 
 8. Kieran Tranter, Nomology, Ontology and Phenomenology of Law and 
Technology, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 449 (2007). 
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relevant.  Second, he warns that decision-makers should 
beware of being blinded by a technology.  They should look 
beyond the technology at stake and focus on the legal issues.  
Finally, Mandel cautions that future disputes are often 
unforeseen and, therefore, decision-makers should remain 
cognizant of the limits of their knowledge.9 
 Arthur Cockfield and Jason Pridmore offer a synthetic 
theory of law and technology, which combines instrumental 
theories that treat technology as a neutral tool and substantive 
theories that emphasize the control that technology can exert 
over individuals.  Cockfield and Pridmore propose that a 
synthetic theory of law and technology should first consider 
whether technological change threatens a traditional interest 
that the law seeks to protect.  If traditionally protected legal 
interests are threatened, legal analysis should adopt a more 
contextual approach that is less deferential to doctrinal 
analysis.10 
 Gaia Bernstein suggests that focusing on the technological 
characteristics that influence a technology’s diffusion—its 
social adoption process—could provide fine-tuned policy 
guidelines that differentiate between categories of technologies.  
Bernstein relies on two case studies involving genetic 
discrimination and collection of personal information on the 
Internet.  Both cases concern a problematic relationship 
between privacy and diffusion.  Bernstein shows that two goals 
could be achieved by focusing on diffusion characteristics.  
First, the identification of the diffusion characteristics that 
made a technology susceptible to the problem could be useful in 
predicting in advance which technologies are likely to fall prey 
to similar controversies.  Second, understanding the role of 
diffusion characteristics could serve to formulate policy 
guidelines, contributing not only to resolving the controversies 
at hand, but also future disputes involving similar technologies. 
 Frank Pasquale focuses on technologies that destabilize 
the value of equality.  Pasquale argues that despite common 
belief that technological advances enhance equality, in fact, 
many technologies actually enhance social strife.  He proposes 
that the law should not cripple the development of these 
 9. Gregory Mandel, History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and 
Technology, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 551 (2007). 
 10. Arthur Cockfield & Jason Pridmore, A Synthetic Theory of Law and 
Technology, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 474 (2007). 
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equality-threatening technologies.  However, he suggests that 
inequality enhancement should be a quality of technology 
salient enough to lead to some systematic prescriptions for 
legal intervention.11 
 The primary objective of this symposium was to commence 
a dialogue on the topic of a general theory of law and 
technology within the community of law and technology 
scholars.  This symposium only revealed the tip of the iceberg 
of an important issue that warrants further attention. Much 
research remains to be done and many debates are yet to be 
had. It is my hope that this symposium provides the impetus 
for a continued conversation. 
 11. Frank Pasquale, Technology, Competition and Values, 8 MINN. J. L. 
SCI. & TECH. 607 (2007). 
